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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The respondent asserts that the pertinent questions
presented for review among the six listed by the appellant can be
subsumed in the following three:
1.

Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect

a decrease in the rental rate for storage units?
2.

Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the

plaintiff for defendants failure to pay the full amount of rent
in accordance with law?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review

the postjudgment actions of the trial court, and if so, were such
actions in accordance with law?
JURISDICTION
Based on the fact that the Order of Affirmance in the
Utah Court of Appeals was dated June 5, 1990, and that the Order
Denying Petition for Rehearing was dated July 2, 1990, copies of
both of which documents are in defendant's Petition, plaintiff
does not contest that this Court has jurisdiction to consider a
Writ of Certiori under Sections 78-2a-4 and Subsections 78-2-2(3)(a)
and (5) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court granted Summary Judgment and denied a
Motion for a New Trial.

The plaintiff made a Motion to Dismiss the

appeal under Rule 3(a) and in the alternative, a Motion for Summary
Affirmance pursuant to Rule 10(a)(2) on August 11, 1989, but to no
avail.

However, the case was calendared and affirmed under Rule

2
31/ since it involved uncomplicated factual issues based primarily
on documents and was a review of summary judgment based on
uncomplicated issues of law where the substantive rules of law
were settled.
Summary Judgment Basis
In its Motion for Summary Judgment/ which is included in
the record on appeal (ROA) at 56/ plaintiff listed the following
material undisputed facts. As to the pleadings cited in this list/
the Answer and its Exhibits are found at ROA 70, the Admissions
at ROA 63 (and 56)/ the Affidavit of Audrey Hooper at ROA 56, the
Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson at ROA 56/ the Affidavit of Lynn
P. Heward at ROA 56/ the Three-Day Notice and Return at ROA 74, the
Rental Agreement at ROA 74 and 56 and included in the Petition/
the reminder notice at ROA 74 and 56 and attached hereto, and the
Complaint and its attachments at ROA 74.
1.

Plaintiff is doing business in Utah County, State

of Utah, and the owner of the premises situated at 420 East 620
South in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah,
which includes self-storage units, specifically including units
143 and 144.
2.

(Answer *[ 1)
The amount in controversy is less than $10,000

exclusive of costs.
3.

(Answer 5T 1)

The defendant William L. Echols resides in Utah

County, State of Utah.
4.

(Answer <T 1)

On or about June 12, 1987, the plaintiff (hereinafter

sometimes referred to as American) and the defendant (hereinafter
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sometimes referred to as Echols) entered into a Rental Agreement
pursuant to which American did let and rent to Echols the said
storage units 143 and 144.
5.

(Answer 5 1)

As shown in the said Rental Agreement, a copy of

which is included in the Petition and by this reference incorporated herein, the rental agreement was for a month-to-month term
based on a calendar month, with either party having the right to
terminate the Agreement by giving written notice of such termination
to the other party at least 15 days prior to the end of the month.
(Answer If 1)
6.

The said Agreement provided for rent at the rate of

$55 per month for both units, with American having the right to
increase the rent by giving notice of the increase at least 15
days prior to the month when the increase was to be effective.
(Answer 5 1)
7.

Effective February 1, 1988, the rent of the said two

units was increased to a total of $80 per month.
8.

(Answer if 1)

American gave notice of this said increase in rent

in accordance with the Rental Agreement, and/or any defect in the
manner or timing of the notice was waived by Echols and the notice
and the increased rent was accepted and agreed upon.
9.

Echols paid $80 on each of three occasions, February

1, March 8, and April 8, all in 1988.
10.

(Answer l[ 1)

(Answer y 2)

The said Rental Agreement provided for Echols to

pay a $7 late fee for all payments not received within 10 days
of the first of the month.

(Answer f 1)
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11.

Thus on April 8, 1988, Echols had paid the rent for

the period through April of 1988.
12.

(Admission 51 1 for #2)

In the month of May, 198 8, Echols made a payment

in the sum of $55.

He has excused himself for paying this lesser

amount by arguing that a reminder notice for that month specified
the old rent.
hereto.

A copy of the said reminder notice is attached

(Answer IF 3)
13.

Echols made four more monthly payments of $55 each

to American despite communication to him clearly indicating that
the notice for May was a mistake and that the rental rate of $8 0
per month had not changed.

(Answer $ 4, Affidavit of Audrey

Hooper)
14.

In view of Echols1 failure to pay $25 of the $80

demanded for each of these months, American denied Echols access
to his units beginning in May of 1988 and extending until September
10, 1988.

(Answer 1[ 5)
15.

On or about September 10, 1988, American gave written

notice to Echols that the rent would increase to $94 per month for
the two units effective October 1, 1988.

(Answer 5 4 and Exhibit

6, and Admission 1[ 1 for #7)
16.

Also on or about September 10, 1988, American agreed

that it would waive all prior defaults provided that Echols either
began paying the current properly increased rent of $47 per unit,
or moved his belongings out.
17.

(Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson)

On September 10, 1988, defendant was allowed access

to his units for the purpose of moving his belongings out in the
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event he chose that alternative .
18.

(Answer JT 4)

Echols did not move all of his belongings out of the

units, and still has not removed them.
19.

(Admission f 1 on #9)

Echols claimed that American owed him in excess of

$5,000 for formerly denying him access to his belongings. As
indicated in his letter dated October 10, 1988, a copy of which was
attached to the Complaint herein and by this reference incorporated
herein, he planned to add interest at the rate of 1.5% per month
and deduct the $94 monthly rental from this $5,000 plus interest.
(Admission 51 1 on #10)
20.

American never agreed that it owed Echols this

money, nor that Echols could offset such claims against rent.
(Admission J 6 on #11)
21.

After making the said five payments of $55 each

during May through September of 1988, Echols made no further cash
payments to plaintiff.
22.

(Admissions f 1 on 14)

No representative or agent of American ever physical

entered any of the subject units rented by Echols without his
permission.
23.

(Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson)
However American did follow the extrajudicial

remedies provided for contractually and by law when there is a
default, and denied Echols access to the storage units he was
renting during the period of November 10, 1988 through January 3,
1989.

(Answer f 10, Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson)
24.

A Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate dated

December 23, 1988, executed by Lynn P. Heward on behalf of the
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American, and requiring the payment of $448 was properly served on
Echols on January 4r 1989. Thus American had determined to avail
itself of the judicial remedies and eviction procedures provided
by statute.

(Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate and the

return attesting to its service attached to the Complaint)
25.

The said Notice also included a Notice to Quit

providing that in any event Echols would be required to quit the
premises by the end of January, 1989.
26.

(Admission f 1 on #16)

This notice of termination was given in a proper

and timely manner to make the termination effective no later than
as of the end of January, 1989.

(Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or

Vacate and the return attesting to its service)
27.

Once again, Echols was given access to his units.

Confirmation that such access was available was left for him before
the said Notice was served.
28.

(Answer IT 1)

Nevertheless, Echols failed to either pay the said

$448 rent in cash or vacate the premises.

(Admission 5 1 on #4

and #9)
29.

The monthly rental and the rental value of the

premises is $94 per month, or approximately $3 per day.

(Affidavit

of Steven J. Nelson)
30.

The said Rental Agreement provided that in the

event of default on the part of Echols, he would pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which might arise
or accrue from enforcing the agreement, or in obtaining possession
of the premises, or otherwise resulting from enforcement of any
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right arising out of such default.

(Answer f 1, Rental Agreement

included in the Petition)
31.

Should this case be disposed of upon Motion for

Summary Judgment, reasonable attorney's fees will amount to $lf500
and costs will amount to $65.

(Affidavit of Lynn P. Heward)

The foregoing list of undisputed material facts presented
to the trial court at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment
and to the Court of Appeals would still seem to include all of the
facts necessary to determine whether the trial court and Court of
Appeals were correct in ruling as they did in the appealed orders.
Post-Judgment Events
Since the defendant has referred to numerous events
subsequent to the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment,
some of which are not referred to or included in the record on
appeal, a list of those events will be added hereto.
1.

A Minute Entry dated June 15, 1989 conveyed Judge

Backlund's decision to grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
and deny defendant's Motion for Dismissal. ROA at 48.

In accordance

therewith, an Order and Judament was prepared and a copy mailed to
the defendant on June 16, 1989.

ROA at 43. This Order and Judgment

was subsequently signed and entered June 28, 1989, and is being
appealed.

ROA at 15.
2.

On that same day, June 28, 1989, the clerk of the court

executed a Writ of Restitution and an Execution.
26.

ROA at 10, 11

These were given to a Utah County Constable, along with a

Praecipe from the plaintiff's attorney directing that all nonexempt
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property still in the storage units be sold pursuant to the Executi
ROA at 42.
3.

The Constable thereupon restored the premises to the

plaintiff on June 29, 1989 and published a Notice of Property Sale
dated June 29, 1989 scheduling a sale of the listed property found
in the storage units for July 11, 1989 at 12:00 noon. ROA at 10,
11, 26.
4.

Meanwhile, the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceeding

to Enforce a Judgment and the Defendant's Motion for New Trial were
filed June 19, 1989, the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Summary
Judgment was filed July 7, 1989, and the Defendant's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order was filed July 10, 1989. ROA at 44,
45, 38, 35.
5.

On July 11, 1989 at about 11:30 a.m., Judge Joseph

I. Dimick was presented ex-parte with an Order to Grant Temporary
Restraining Order Against the Plaintiff, which he executed at that
time.

ROA at 33.
6.

kfter the expiration of the Restraining Order on July

14, 1989, the Notice of Property Sale was again given, this time
for July 25, 1989 at noon.
7.

ROA at 10, 11.

Defendant then apparently renewed the earlier Defendant

Motion to Stay Proceeding to Enforce a Judgment by filing on July
17, 1989 Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings by Plaintiff to
Enforce Summary Judgment Against Defendant.
8.

ROA at 24.

On July 20, 1989, the trial court issued a Ruling

listing and denying all of the defendant's post-judgment motions.
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ROA at 18. On that same date defendant filed the Notice of Appeal
appealing from the original Summary Judgment as well as from that
denial of his Motion for New Trial and to Vacate Summary Judgment.
ROA at 15.
9.

On July 21, 1989 defendant filed a case in this

Court of Appeals, Echols v. Fourth Circuit Court, No. 890455,
seeking an extraordinary writ and referring to the said July 20,
1989 Ruling and to the Notice of Property Sale regarding the sale
set for July 25, 1989 at noon.
10.

No writ was issued.

Defendant's Motion for Disposition of Property was

then filed on July 26, 1989, requesting the names of the buyers of
the property, a list of what was sold, and the amount paid.

ROA

at 13. This was partially granted by means of a Ruling on Defendant's
Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989, with
plaintiff being required to furnish a written accounting of the
property sold and the amount received and applied to expenses of
sale and the judgment amount, but not being required to give the
name and address of the buyer of such items. ROA at 2.

The Accounting

of Property Sold dated August 17, 1989 was filed in compliance
with that Ruling.
11.

ROA at 79.

On August 15, 1989, the trial court issued an Order

in Supplemental Proceedings requiring the defendant to appear
before the court and answer questions concerning his property, but
declined to allow that Order to be served by mail.

ROA at 1.

Since he had not been served prior to a hearing on September 26,
1989, the court ordered him to answer questions at that time
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concerning his property.

He answered many questions, but refused

to divulge the location of a camera and of the video games that
had been stored in the units before, the denial of access to which
had allegedly caused him damages of $5,000.
12.

ROA at 95, 69.

When the court informed him that he must state

where those games were, and he still refused, the court found him
to be in contempt of court, and he was incarcerated until he would
answer the questions presented.
13.
counsel.

ROA at 93, 96.

Two days later he was willing to talk to plaintiff's

At that time he stated he did not own these items any

more and did not know where they were.

However he refused to

state their last known whereabouts.
14.

On October 4, 1989, counsel for the parties appeared

at a hearing and stipulated to an arrangement, later embodied in an
Order dated October 25, 1989, which allowed for the immediate
release of the defendant from jail and specified a course of
action by means of which he could remain free. ROA at 102. That
course of action was essentially followed.
15.

Also on October 4, 1989, counsel for defendant

mentioned for the first time in this action that some of the
property sold may have been exempt.

The first written reference

by the defendant to any exempt property was the Defendant's Motion
for Enforcement of Exempt Property Allowances dated November 17,
1989, again filed pro se.

Defendant's counsel had appeared on

October 4, 1989 and withdrew on November 21, 1989.
16.

ROA at 98.

The said Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property
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Allowances was essentially denied by the Ruling dated December 6,
1989, referring to the Ruling dated August 10, 1989.

ROA at 1.

REASONS TO DENY CERTIORI
Petitioner appears to rely on Rule 46(c) in petitioning
this Court for a Writ of Certiori, arguing that the Court of
Appeals "has departed so far from the accepted and usual course of
of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's
supervision."

Petition at 2.

However, the Court of Appeals was entirely correct and
acted properly in affirming the trial court's Summary Judgment, as
can be seen from a brief review of the law pertaining to the issues
recited above.
1.

A MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES NOT EFFECT

A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS.
This whole case began when Echols claimed that he only
had to pay $55 a month instead of $80 per month for his two storage
units.

This claim was based on the reminder notice attached hereto.
As a matter contract interpretation, and thus as a

matter of law, this reminder notice did not reduce the rent.
As it was written, the Rental Agreement in paragraph II
provided for a method to increase the rent.

However, there was no

way set forth to decrease the rent. Thus the only way the rent
could be reduced would be to have an amendment.
Paragraph IX.g. of the Rental Agreement specifically
states, "No amendment or alteration shall be binding unless made
in writing and signed by both parties."
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There never was any amendment or alteration in writing
and signed by both parties.

Hence there was no reduction in rent.

There is no allegation that plaintiff intended to reduce
the rent, and plaintiff did nothing that would estop the plaintiff
from denying a decrease in the rent.
In the first place, it was a mistake on a reminder
notice.

It would not be reasonable for someone to rely on that

notice, without more, to evidence an intent to reduce the rent
from the level to which it had recently been raised back down to
the previous level.
In the second place, as soon as plaintiff had any indicati
that the mistake had been made and relied upon, every effort was
made to clarify that it was only a mistake and there had never
been any intention to reduce the rent.
A case which includes many of the principles which
should thus be applied in analyzing this matter is Provo City
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).
First, this case shows that the trial court was quite
able to interpret the contract without having to make a factual
determination.
Second, although there could have been a modification of
the agreement allowing a reduction in the amount of rent, despite
the lack of provision in the original agreement for such a reduction
this could only have happened if there was a meeting of the minds.
Likewise in the instant matter, there is no allegation
or proof of a meeting of the minds. Rather, there is overwhelming
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and undisputed proof of inadvertence and an absence of intention
and a lack of meeting of the minds on the part of the plaintiff as
to any reduction in rent.
Finally, there are no ambiguities in the subject contract
relating to a reduction in rent. There are simply no provision
for such a reduction.

It follows that no such provision should be

added.
Thus, as a matter of law in contract interpretation,
there was no effective decrease in rent, and hence no need to
follow the procedures for increasing the rent in order to maintain
it at the previous level.
Defendant argues that the courts wrongfully ignored a
discrepancy between the deposed testimony and the signed affidavit
of the former manager.

Affidavit of Audrey Hooper at ROA 56 and

included in Petition.

The only discrepancy is that the affidavit

acknowledges a mistake by the manager (herself) in filling out the
reminder notice and the deposition clarifies that the mistake was
actually made by an underling helping her. ROA at 53 (Compare
Deposition p. 34 ROA at 50). Thus the discrepancy is completely
immaterial.
2.

THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF

FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

I

Plaintiff had a legal contractual and statutory right
to deny defendant access to the storage units beginning in May of
1988 and extending until September 10, 1988.
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Paragraph VIII. b. of the Rental Agreement set forth the
remedy of denying the defendant access to his personal property,
and specified that this remedy was available to the plaintiff
alone or in conjunction with other remedies in the event of default
Chapter 38-8 of the Utah Code impliedly or implicitly
provides for and condones such denial of access where it is permitt
under the terms of the rental agreement pertaining to a self-storag
facility.

Specifically, Section 38-8-3 sets forth the procedure

for selling the personal property stored in self-storage units,
and provides that no such enforcement of the lien can be taken
until after notice has been given, which notice must advise of the
"denial of access to the personal property, if such denial is
permitted under the terms of the rental agreement" (Subsection
38-8-3(3)(c)).
Thus the only prerequisite for the denial of access is
that such denial be permitted under the terms of the rental agreemei
Such permission is found in the Agreement as follows:
VIII. DEFAULT BY OCCUPANT: Time is of the
essence in the performance of obligations
created by this Rental Agreement. Failure of
the Occupant to perform in a timely manner any
obligation or duty set forth in this Rental
Agreement shall constitute Default and Owner
may proceed to do any or all of the following:
a. Terminate Occupant's right of possession
of the Storage Unit by any lawful means.
b. Deny Occupant access to the personal
property.
c. Provide written notice of the default and
the Owners claim to the Occupant [and others] of
the Owner's claim, a brief and general description
of the personal property subject to the Owner's
lien, notification of denial of access to the
personal property, a demand for payment, and a
statement that, unless the claim is paid
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within the time stated, the personal property
will be sold or otherwise disposed of, as
provided by law.
d. Take appropriate action to enforce the
Owner's lien rights as is provided by law.
... [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff thus under the contract had the right and
option to follow any or all of the lettered courses of action to
obtain a remedy for defendant's failure to pay the full amount of
rent under the Agreement.
The plaintiff first chose option b.

This led to numerous

letters and documents and arguments and threats from the defendant•
So plaintiff offered to forget the default if defendant would
forget his claims and thereafter abide by the contract.

However,

defendant again defaulted and eventually would pay nothing except
allow an offset on his alleged claim.

Again plaintiff initially chose

option b. as a remedy.
Finally, plaintiff decided to follow option a. instead
of c. and d.

Thus defendant was allowed access to his units and

plaintiff followed the procedures estabished for an unlawful
detainer action.
Therefore, in light of the Rental Agreement and the
applicable statutes, plaintiff did nothing that was actionable or
prohibited by law.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
THE POSTJUDGMENT ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ACTIONS WERE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
As mentioned in the Statement of the Case above, there
was a Notice of Appeal dated and filed July 20, 1989 appealing (1)
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the Order and Judgment dated June 28, 1989 which granted plaintiff1
Motion for Summary Judgment, including dismissal with prejudice of
the Counterclaim, and denied defendant's Motion for Dismissal; and
(2) the Ruling dated July 20, 1989 insofar as it denied the defenda
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment.
However, no other notice of appeal was filed.

Therefore

the Court of Appeals did not and could nnot have jurisdiction to
review any order of the trial court entered after July 20, 1989
and before December 15, 1989. These orders include but are not
limited to all matters pertaining to enforcement of the said Order
and Judgment, and specifically (1) the Ruling on Defendant's
Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989 denying
the defendant's motion to require the defendant to furnish the
name and address of the buyer of each item sold at the execution
sale (ROA at 2 ) ; and (2) the Ruling dated December 6, 1989 essential
denying Defendant's Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property
Allowances dated and filed November 17, 1989.
On November 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued an
Order Denying Motion for Relief, in which the said Motion for
Relief was denied, a copy of which Order is attached hereto.

The

Order reviewed a number of possible interpretations of the Motion
for Relief, and gave corresponding reasons for denial.

It went on

to state that "proceedings occurring subsequent to the final order
being appealed are outside the scope of the issues on appeal, a
defect which cannot be cured by amendment of the docketing statement
filed in this appeal."
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Rather than by amending the docketing statement, review
of a postjudgment order is obtained by filing a notice of appeal.
As indicated in the case of Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d
140 (Utah 1982), postjudgment orders are independently subject to
the test of finality, according to their substance and effect. If
a party desires to appeal such a final order, that party must
follow the procedure established and file a notice of appeal
within the 30 days.
When such a notice of appeal is not filed, or is not
filed in a timely manner, summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
is appropriate.

State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989).

Since the orders dealing with the enforcement of the
Order and Judgment were all entered more than 3 0 days ago, and
have not been referred to in any notice of appeal, they cannot be
reviewed.
However, no error nor need for redress arose during
those postjudgment proceedings.

The Order and Judgment was entered

after its form had been reviewed by the defendant for the appropriate
amount of time. The Execution and Writ of Restitution could be
and were issued immediately.
Defendant has complained that property not belonging to
him and/or property that was exempt was sold by the Constable.
As to property not belonging to him, that would not seem
to be a defense.

The contract provision VIII.d. clearly provides

in capital letters that in the event of a default "ALL ARTICLES
STORED ... WILL BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF TO PAY CHARGES."
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This contract provisionr as well as the law allowing for a lien
and foreclosure of that lien by sale of the personal property,
cannot be circumvented merely by having someone other than the
owner contract for the storage.
As to the claim that the property was exempt, although
there may not be any statute that requires the person entitled to
an exemption to make it known, it appears that requirement is
implied.

For example, in Section 78-23-12 of the Utah Code, it stai
If an individual fails to select property
entitled to be claimed as exempt or to object
to a levy on the property or to assert any
other right under this chapter, the spouse or
a dependent of the individual or any other
authorized person may make the claim or objection
or assert the rights provided by this chapter.
This statute would not be necessary, or certainly not

necessary in such general terms, if Echols had no duty to come
forward before or at the time of the sale and assert any exemption
rights he might claim.
At this time, the defendant has made known his claim.
However, it was and is too late to claim an exemption.
In Oliver v. Mitchell, 14 Utah 2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962),
it was pointed out the claim to an exemption would have to be made
before the sale:
We have no statute providing a formal time
and manner for claiming an insurance exemption.
However, there is no reason why the general
rule should not apply to allow proof of exemption
any time before sale. Ixl. 14 Utah 2d at 13.
In the instant matter, not only was the sale held before
any mention of a claim of exemption (or ownership by other parties),
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but the physical possession was transferred to the purchaser who
was an independent third party, the money paid to the plaintiff,
and much of the property resold by that purchaser.
Defendant filed numerous documents pertaining to the
sale, both before and after it was held.

But none of these oppor-

tunities were used to mention any claim of exemption.
Finally, on November 17, 1989, nearly four months after
the sale, the first documents were filed by defendant which referred
to exempt property.

These documents were filed too late to be

part of the record on appeal.

Likewise, they were filed too late

for the Court to be able to equitably make allowance for any such
exemption.

All the items of personal property had been sold in a

final sale on July 25, 1989, to an unrelated third party, and
nearly all of the items have been resold to other parties since then.
Not only does the delay in claiming an exemption bar
defendant from now claiming error, but it indicates that in all
likelihood, nothing was sold that was exempt.

Another such indication

is that he and/or his family reside in a home which is probably
furnished with their belongings.
his home address.

Defendant would never divulge

He has indicated he has a wife and children

living in a home in Utah County, but he will not be more specific
as to the address.

It is only logical that the property that

would be exempt from execution would thus be in a residence at a
location unknown to plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The appealed orders of the trial court were properly affirmed
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in all respects, since in view of the undisputed facts, they
comported with law, justice, and equity.

Therefore the Appellant's

Petition for Writ of Certiori should be denied.
DATED this

2- ~7 ^

day of

,^£

, 1990

LYNN P. HEWARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

«;i M Court

OOOoo

American Fork Investors/ a
California limited partnership/
dba American Self Storage/
Plaintiff and Respondent/

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RELIEF
Case No. 890461-CA

v.
William L. EcholS/
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant is proceeding pro se and has filed a "motion for
relief/" the exact purpose of which is less than clear.
Insofar as the motion is one for a stay, it must be denied
because appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of
Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Insofar as he otherwise seeks to suspend enforcement of the
judgment/ the motion must be denied because he has not filed a
supersedeas bond as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d). Insofar
as the motion seeks summary reversal of the judgment appealed
from# summary reversal has previously been denied. The present
demand for reversal is inadequately supported and'must also be
denied.
Furthermore/ proceedings occurring subsequent to the final
order being appealed are outside the scope of the issues on
appeal/ a defect which cannot be cured by amendment of the
docketing statement filed in this appeal.
Appellant's motions are accordingly denied.
Dated this _J/it-day of November, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Gregoxy

me, Judge

